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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND LABOR DISPUTES AT THE
"FACTORY, ESTABLISHMENT, OR OTHER PREMISES"
Few deny the desirability of insurance against the economic hardships
which flow from unemployment. This has been indicated by the passage of
unemployment compensation acts by every state1 during the last two decades.
However, no such unanimity exists concerning the question of applicability of
these statutes to those unemployed as a result of a labor dispute. Blanket labor
dispute disqualification would prevent labor unions from utilizing benefit payments as a weapon in collective bargaining; however, such disqualification
would also penalize those unemployed and result in economic hardship to the
idle workers, their families, and their communities.
The acts, which are largely modeled after the Social Security Board's
draft bill,2 have permitted a compromise by establishing limitations short of
blanket labor dispute ineligibility. Typically, it is provided that an applicant
may be disqualified from receiving benefits if his unemployment is due to a
stoppage of work arising out of a labor dispute at the "factory, establishment,
or other premises" 3 at which he was last employed, except where neither he
nor any member of his "grade or class of workers" is participating in, financing, or directly interested in the labor dispute.4 -Thus, an employee vho is,
1. See Note, 49 COL. L. Rzv. 550 n.1 (1940) for a collection of these statutes.
2. SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, DLRAr BILLs FOR. STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
OF POOLED FUND AND EMPLOYER RESERVE ACcOUNT, TYPES (1936). Wisconsin, however,
had passed such an act in 1932. Wis. Spec. Sess. Laws 1931-32, c. 20.
One reason for the states adhering to the draft bill is that the Social Security Board
must approve a state's unemployment compensation law as being in accordance with the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act, se note 7 ii fra, before the state may receive federal
grants-in-aid in administering its compensation system. 49 STAT. 626 (1935), as amended,
53 STAT. 1378 (1939). 42 U.S.C. § 503 (1940).
3. The statutes of Ala., Cal., D.C., Ky., Mich., Minn., N.Y., R.I., and Wis. use only
the words "in the establishment": ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 214 subd. A (1940) ; CAL.
GEN. LAWS act 8780(d), § 56a (1944); D.C. CODE § 46-310(f) (Cum. Supp. 1948);
KY. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 341.360(1) (1948); MICH. CoiMP. LAws § 421.29(1) .(b) (1948);

MINN. STAT. § 268.09, subd. 1(6) (1945); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 592(1) ; R.I. GEN. LAWs
c. 284, § 7(4) (1938) ; Wis. STAT. § 108.04(10) (1947). The Utah statute specifies a
"factory or establishment": UTAH CODE ANN. § 42-2a-5(d) (1943). Idaho has no comparable provision: Idaho Laws 1947, c. 269, § 66(j). The laws of the remaining majority
of the states speak of "factory, establishment, or other premises."
4. See note 1 supra. An illustrative statute provides that a claimant shall be disqualified for benefits: "For any week with respect to which the commission finds that
his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of
a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last
employed, provided that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction
of the commission that(1) He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute
which caused the stoppage of work- and
(2) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before
the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at
which stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested
in the dispute.

NOTES
directly engaged in a strike, or who is a member of a grade or class of workers
who are striking at the same plant, is ineligible for benefits; but employees
who are idle because of a strike in another independent company may obtain
benefits. A closer question arises when geographically separated plants of the
same company are shut down by a strike in one of the units. The determination as to eligibility of the non-striking workers, who are of the same grade
or class as the strikers, generally turns upon the interpretation of the word
"establishment," as used in the labor dispute disqualification clauses.5 This
question was involved in several recent cases6 growing out.of the Ford strike
of 1949.
Twenty-five thousand Ford Motor Company employees in assembly
plants located throughout the United States were "laid off," due to a lack of
parts, soon after Ford's parts-producing workers at Dearborn, Michigan, went
on a sympathy strike in aid of striking Dearborn assembly-line employees.
Both groups were members of the same local union. Under the company-wide
collective bargaining agr~ement between Ford and the UAW-CIO, arbitration
of the dispute of the Dearborn assembly workers would affect uniformly all
Ford assembly-line employees, wherever located. The officers of the International UAW-CIO refused Ford's request that they order the Dearborn
parts-producing employees back to work. Subsequently, Ford assembly-line
workers throughout the country applied for unemployment compensation.
Since these benefits are financed by a payroll tax on employers, 7 Ford, as an
"Provided, that if any case separate branches of work which are commonly conducted
as separate businesses in separate premises are conducted in separate departments of the
same premises, each such department shall, for the purposes of this subsection, be deemed
to be a separate factory, establishment, or other premises." VA. CODE ANN. § 1887(97) (d)

(1942).
But in nine states blanket labor dispute disqualification exists. See Note, 33 MINN.
L. REv. 758, 763 n.38 (1949). However, even these states require that the labor dispute
be at the "establishment" where the claimant was last employed, before he will be declared
ineligible.

5. One state provides by statute that all plants operated by the same employer, which
are located in the state, are to be considered as one establishment in determining eligibility
under the labor dispute disqualification clause. CONN. LAws c. 374, § 7508(3) (Supp.
1949). The Ford strike illustrates the inadequacy of such a provision.
6. Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464, 62 S.E.2d 209 (1950) ; Ford Motor
Co. v. Div. of Empl. Sec., 96 N.E.2d 859 (Mass. 1951) ; Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 231
Minn. 68, 42 N.W.2d 576 (1950); Ford Motor Co. v. Board of Review, 5 N.J. 494, 76
A.2d 256 (1950) ; Ford Motor Co. v. U.C.C., 191 Va. 812, 63 S.E.2d 28 (1951).
7. 49 STAT. 639 (1935), as amended, 53 STAT. 1396 (1939), 26 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1611
(1948) (Federal Unemployment Tax Act). Also, see SOcIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
COMPARiSON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS AS OF OCTOBER 1948, 12 (1948).
The payment of benefits in a given state would adversely affect Ford's payroll tax

rate for the subsequent year. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-7(c) (4) (Cum. Supp.
1941). But, it has been suggested that different considerations may apply in states where
the compensation fund is a general pooling, rather than a reserve account or guaranteed
employment account. See Note, 19 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rxv. 294, 302 (1942). In two states
employees are required to contribute. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 202 (1940) ; N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 43:21-7(d) (Cum. Supp. 1941).
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interested party, appealed the granting of compensation to the workers in
8
several jurisdictions.
Several tests have been applied in the construction of the term "establishment" as used in the labor dispute disqualification. Under the British act,9
which has served as a prototype for the American laws, an employee is disqualified if he is unemployed "by reason of a stoppage of work . . . due to

a trade dispute at the factory, workshop or other premises at which he was
employed ...."10 The umpire, who is the highest authority under the British
act,"- has consistently ruled that "workshop," like "factory," refers to a single
geographical unit.12 The "geggraphical proximity" test is also frequently
applied in this country, 8 and in those Ford cases where benefits were allowed,
it was primarily upon the ground that the geographically separated plants were
not one "establishment."' 14 An inherent difficulty of the geographic test is
determining the required degree of proximity before separate plants will be
considered one "establishment." More important are the illogical and often
unfortunate results of basing eligibility upon geography, rather than upon
participation, interest in the strike, or need. 15 However, this test provides the
most logical definition of "establishment," and restricts labor dispute disqualifications to those unemployed at the area of the dispute.
Ford contended that its country-wide system constituted one establishment because of the "functional integration" of its plants,' 8-an argumnent
successfully used in some earlier cases. In Spielnan v. Industrial Commnission,17 it was held that two plants forty miles apart were one establishment
8. See note 6 supra. First appeals are to an arbitrator or referee. E.g., 3 C.C.H.
UNEMPL. IN S. REP.

20, 555 (Ky. Referee 1949).

9. National Insurance Act, 1911, 1 & 2 GEo. 5, c. 55, as amended, 10 & 11 GEo. 5, c.
30 (1920), 14 & 15 GEo. 5, c. 30 (1924), 25 GEo. 5, c. 8 (1935) ; 9 & 10 GEo. 6, c. 67
(1946). The Social Security Board's model bill was patterned after this act.
. 10. The only substantial difference between most American labor dispute disqualification provisions and that of the British act is the substitution of the word "establishment"
in the former for "workshop" in the latter. See note 4 supra.
11. 25 GEo. 5, c. 8, part III, § 44(6) (1935).
12. See Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Minn. 68, 89, 42 N.W.2d 576, 588 (1950).
13. E.g., Walgreen Co. v. Murphy, 386 IIl. 32, 53 N.E.2d 390 (1944).
14. See cases cited in note 6 supra. In Ford Motor Co. v. Div. of Empl. Sec., 96 N.F_.2d.
859, 862 (Mass. 1951), the court remarked that: "The statute . . . impresses us as
laying stress upon geographical location.
It is probably true, as several courts have suggested, that the word "establishment,"
as used in the labor dispute disqualification clauses of the unemployment compensation
acts, was originally intended only to extend the application of the acts to places not
properly described as factories. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Mulquin, 134 Conn.
118, 126, 55 A.2d 732, 736 (1947).
15. While the unemployment compensation statutes have not specified "need" as a
criterion of eligibility, observe, for example, the language of the policy section of the
Georgia Unemployment Compensation Law quoted in note 38 infra.
16. See Ford Motor Co. v. Div. of Empl. Sec., 96 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Mass. 1951);
Ford Motor Co. v. Board of Review, 5 N.J. 494, 501, 76 A.2d 256, 260 (1950); Ford
Motor Co. v. U.C.C., 191 Va. 812, 821, 63 S.E.2d 28, 32 (1951).
17. 236 Wis. 240, 295 N.W. 1 (1940).
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even though their owners were not identical, but only affiliated, and afthough
each plant had its separate wage and labor contract, its own seniority aridservice record, and its own labor union. In Chrysler Corp. v. Smith,8 nine
plants within eleven miles of the main plant were held to be a single establishment.

Thus, the court in Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie,0 said:

It cannot be held on any basis of reason and logic that mere separate
locations, regardless of the distance, of these indispensable functions
do and could change them into two separate factories, establishments,
or other premises.2"
Actually, the "functional integration" test is worthless. If a labor dispute
at one plant causes a work stoppage in another, it is evident that the plants
are "functionally integrated."'
Consequently, a logical application of this,
definition would inevitably preclude recovery of benefits in all such cases.
It was also advocated that the various Ford plants constituted one establishment from the standpoint of union organization. The Supreme Court of
Georgia22 disallowed the payment of benefits to Ford's Georgia employees on
the ground that the refusal of the international union's officers to disapprove
of the Michigan strike, which they had authority to do under the union constitution, was imputable to the claimants in Georgia. The international of ficers were said to be agents for the members since under the union constitution
they were agents of the members in bargaining for an employment contract.
It was immaterial that the Georgia claimants desired to work.
Aside from attempting to show merely that the Georgia plant and the
Michigan plant were a single establishment from the standpoint of employment, because of the union arrangement, the Georgia court seemed to assume
that the claimants participatedvia their agents. But participation in a stoppage
is not synonymous with participation in the dispute which causes that stoppage,2 3 and the initiative had been taken by Ford in laying off its Georgia
employees.

24

18. 297 Mich. 438, 298 N.W. 87 (1941).
19. 207 Ga. 464, 470, 62 S.E.2d 209, 214 (1950).
20. But cf. Tucker v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 189 Md. 250, 55 A.2d 692

(1947).
21. See Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dispute" Disqualification, 17 U. OF Ci. L. REv. 294, 322 (1950); Note, 49 COL. L. REV. 550, 558 (1949).;

Note, 36 ILL. L. REv. 581, 585 (1942).
22. Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464, 62 S.E.2d 209 (1950).
23. Nor should "stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute" be confused with "unemployment due to a stoppage of work." The former refers to the plant,
the latter to the worker. Lawrence Baking Co. v. U.C.C., 308 Mich. 198, 13 N.W.2d 260
(1944) ; Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N.W.2d 689 (1942) ; in re Steelman, 219
N.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d 544 (1941). Contra: Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum

Corp., 193 Okla. 36, 141 P.2d 69 (1943).
24. Abercrombie v. Ford Motor Co., 81 Ga.App. 690, 692, 59 S.E.2d 664, 666, rev'd on
other grounds, 207 Ga. 464. 62 S.E.2d 209 (1950).
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The agency theory used by the Georgia court to deny benefits is not a
" novel one. In Copen v. Hix,22 membership in an international union which
supported a local strike was held a ground for disqualification, even though
the strikers were foremen and claimants were miners, and members of a different local. Although the decision in that case purported to turn upon the
claimants being of the same "grade or class" as the strikers, the court said,
". .. the members . . . cannot divorce themselves from direct involvement

without showing a contemporaneous disapproval of the organization's activities."26 But how and why should a claimant have to show disapproval of the
international's activities? Such a theory of agency could make mere membership in an international union a bar to recovery of unemployment compensation.
The purpose of the collective bargaining agreement was to treat the
various Ford plants as one unit for bargaining, not to determine unemployment insurance eligibility. It was not contended that the claimants would not
have worked throughout the strike at Dearborn, had the assembly plants had
sufficient parts on hand. Even though the Michigan strike was sanctioned by
union officers who acted with full knowledge that the short. supply of parts
at the various assembly plants would halt production of vehicles, it seems unjust to penalize the non-striking workers in other states. The union constitution expressly provided that any strike vote by a local required ratification
by the officials of the international, and could be overridden by their order
that the strikers return to work.2 7 The claimants could not control the acts of
the union officials, nor would their refusal to ratify the officers' acts have
any effect. So, while the international officers were claimants' agents for the
purpose of making the collective bargaining agreement, they were more like
principals in controlling strikes.
In addition to the contention that its entire system constituted one estabishment, Ford strongly pressed the argument that the claims should b& rejected since the claimants were "directly interested"2" in the Dearborn strike.
Any improved working conditions secured by the Dearborn assembly wor1kdrs
25. 130 W.Va. 343. 43 S.E.2d 382 (1947).
26. Id. at 351, 43 S.E.2d at 386. More convincing is the statement, "...
participation by the international union in a labor dispute on behalf of a local union is not participatiotf of every local represented by the international in such a local dispute. This would
be an unwarranted extension of the principles of agency." Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297
Mich. 438, 474, 298 N.W. 87, 100 (1941) (dissenting opinion).
27. See Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464, 465-66, 62 S.E.2d 209, 212
(1950) ; Ford Motor Co. v. U.C.C., 191 Va. 812, 819, 63 S.E.2d 28, 31 (1951).
28. The weight of authority holds that a labor dispute that affects wages, hours of
work, and general conditions of employment causes all employees concerned to be directly
interested. Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich.,438, 451-52, 458 n., 298 N.W. 87, 92, 94 n.
(1941) ; accord, Auker v. Review Board, 117 Ind. App. 486, 71 N.E.2d 629 (1947) ; Huiet
v. Boyd, 64 Ga. App. 564, 13 S.E.2d 863 (1941). Cf. Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Co.,
403 Ill.
484, 491, 87 N.E.2d 625, 630 (1949). Contra : Kieckhefer Container Co. v. U.C.C.,
125 N.J.L. 52, 13 A.2d 646 (1940).
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would inure to the benefit of all the assemblers wherever located, under the
union agreement. 21 Most of the cases rejected this position because the existence of a "direct interest" is a disqualification only when the labor dispute
occurs at the "factory, establishment, or other premises" in which the claimant
was last employed.3"
It might be urged, however, that "establishment" should be broadly construed so as to include all those directly interested in the labor dispute. Just
as all directly interested employees are denied unemployment compensation
when there is a company-wide strike, so should they all be disqualified when
a strike at one component part causes the entire company to shut down. This
would not impair a legitimate use of the strike weapon by a local union, 31 yet,
would prevent circumvention of the labor dispute disqualification provisions
at the expense of the employer whose premium payments are based upon the
32
employment record of his company.
The mere fact that the claimant's wages or working conditions may be
affected by the dispute should not conclusively' bar him from obtaining compensation. 33 It is doubtful that the payment of compensation to non-striking
employees would materially increase the willingness or ability of the union to
strike. The statutory benefits are a grossly inadequate substitute for the
wage loss, 34 and the ratio of compensation to regular wages is further reduced

by the mandatory waiting period.35 Those directly engaged in the strike
would remain ineligible, and it is unrealistic to believe that the claimants
would forward a portion of their meager compensation awards to the strikers.
Similarly, there is little basis to the claim that the employer would be
compelled to finance a strike against himself. There is evidence that the
It is immaterial to a finding of direct interest whether the.union did or did not
actually succeed in its demands. Nobes v. U.C.C., 313 Mich. 472, 480, 21 N.W.2d 820, 823
(1946).
29. See Abercrombie v. Ford Motor Co., 81 Ga.App. 690, 692-93, 59 S.E.2d 664, 666
(1950).
30. See cases cited in note 6 supra.
31. A strike by the Dearborn assembly workers alone would not have forced the shutdown of the other assembly plants. It was the sympathy strike of the production employees that forced a halt to all production. If the production workers had struck because of a grievance of their own, then the assembly workers would not be disqualified
as they would have had no direct interest in the strike, and were not of the same "grade
or class" as the production workers.
32. See note 7 supra.
33. Since the union may not succeed in its demands, the claimant may gain nothing
from the settlement of the dispute. Furthermore, a construction of "establishment" broad
enough to include all those "directly interested" would also disqualify a worker at a distant plant whose only connection with the strike is that he is a member of a "grade or,
class" of workers who are directly interested, even though the claimant would be unaffected by the strike's settlement.
34. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1536a(a) (Burns Repl. 1951) (twenty dollars per
week maximum).
35. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1538c (Burns Repl. 1951) (one week).
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payroll tax for the support of the compensation system is passed on to the
38
consumer, or even that., in many cases, its incidence is borne by the employees.
Furthermore, the claimants in the Ford cases left their jobs involuntarily
due to a lack of work to perform for which they were not responsible. They
did not participate in the strike vote, nor did they have any voice in the settlement of the dispute. A distant labor dispute should not be permitted to cause
economic dislocation in a community and unnecessary hardships upon the
families of those unemployed through no fault of their own. This would be
in derogation of the very objectives of unemployment compensation."
Basically, the courts in the Ford cases were required to decide whether
the union or the employer should occupy an enhanced.bargaining position, in
the light of the purposes of the compensation acts. Complete neutrality is impossible. Accordingly, if the existing labor dispute disqualification provisions
are to be retained, and the criterion of "establishment" continues to determine
the eligibility of unemployed workers for benefits where the shut-down of one
plant causes the closing of a multi-unit system, then a literal application of
the "geographical proximity" test most nearly obtains the desired result.
Despite the difficulty in determining what constitutes sufficient separation to
avoid disqualification, in most instances recovery may be had where the plants
are in different states or are several miles apart. On this basis most of the
Ford cases were correctly decided.
Nevertheless, it is apparent from the above discussion that the existing
labor dispute disqualification clauses frequently will not permit an adequate
adjustment of the interests of labor,, management, and the public in this area.
It has been suggested that a better solution would be to repeal the labor dispute clauses altogether, as this "would relieve unemployment without being
either an incentive or deterrent to customary forms of labor activity.""8 But
while it is true that benefit payments do not stimulate strikes, it would be contrary to the policy of compensating only those involuntarily unemployed39 to
allow payments to persons directly engaged in a strike.
Conversely, it seems arbitrarily unjust to disqualify anyone who is unemployed because of a strike in which he is not directly participating, even
36. See Schindler, Collective Bargaining and Unemployment Insurance Legislation,

38 COL. L. REv. 858 n.1 (1938).

37. Compare the policy stand taken by the Georgia court in the Abercrombie case with

the policy section of the Georgia Unemployment Compensation Law which states that:
"Involuntary unemployment is . . . a subject . . . which requires appropriate action by

the Legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls
with crushing force upon the unemployed worker or his family. The achievement of
social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life."
Ga. Laws 1937, No. 335, § 2.
38. Fierst and Spector, Unemployment Compensalon in Labor Disputes, 49 YALE LJ.
461, 491 (1940).
39. 'See Harrison, Forenote: Statutory Purpose and "Involuntary Unemploynent,"
55 YALE L.J. 117 (1945).
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when he is employed at the plant where the strike occurs. Under the present
acts, a non-participating employee is ineligible if any member of his "grade
or class" of workers at the establishment where he was employed is participating in, financing, or directly interested in the dispute or if he has a direct
interest in the outcome.41 Such non-participants have not voluntarily left their
jobs, and they are available for work at all times. Therefore, it is desirable
that the labor dispute disqualification clauses be amended so as to make only
actual participation in the dispute a ground for ineligibility. 41
The objectives of unemployment compensation should be42 to reduce the
hazards of involuntary unemployment by providing some security for the
families of the unemployed; to maintain purchasing power in the community;
to increase the stability of employment by inducing employers to maintain
steady employment policies; and to help eliminate the necessity for public
appropriations to support the needy. Although the test of direct participation as the sole criterion of labor dispute disqualification is not without difficulty, 42 it is believed that it would substantially achieve these ends without

placing either labor or management in an unreasonably advantageous bargaining position.
40. See note 4 supra. The "grade or class" provision has been rationalized upon the
grounds of administrative expediency, deterrence of strikes, and discouragement of de-

fections from the union. Queener v. Magnet Mills, Inc., 179 Tenn. 416, 424-25, 167
S.W.2d 1, 4 (1942). But see Note, 49 COL. L. REv.550, 565 (1949).
As previously shown, mere direct interest of the claimant should not disqualify him

for benefits.
41. While perhaps such unemployment can be voluntary even in the absence of labor
dispute participation, only participation should be taken as evidence of that volition.
42. "There never has been agreement as to the purpose of unemployment compensation or its basic principles." Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55
YALE L.J. 21 (1945).
43. The courts Would still be left with the question of what constitutes involuntary
unemployment or participation.

